Keith Burgess-Jackson

Twenty Years Ago

2-28-89 . . . The big political news has to do with President [George Herbert Walker] Bush’s choice for Secretary of Defense, former Texas Senator John Tower. Nearly every other Bush cabinet nomination sailed through the Senate, but this one has been stalled. The problem? First, Tower has admitted to having a drinking problem, though he denies that he is or ever was an alcoholic. Second, he has a reputation as a philanderer, and has admitted to being unfaithful to his former wife. Third, and this is perhaps most serious, he has cozied up to defense contractors since he left the Senate, and many people think that that constitutes a conflict of interest. So things do not look good for him. Bush vows to stand behind his nominee, and Tower has given no indication that he’ll withdraw his nomination, even though the Senate Armed Services Committee just voted to reject the nomination. The matter now goes to the floor of the Senate. It’s expected to be a close vote. If the vote is along party lines, Tower, a Republican, will be defeated, because there are fifty-five Democratic senators and only forty-five Republicans.

Here’s what I find curious. Of the twenty members of the Armed Services Committee, eleven (fifty-five percent) are Democrats. They are led by Sam Nunn of Georgia, who chairs the committee. All eleven Democrats voted to reject the Tower nomination. All nine Republicans voted to affirm the nomination. This has prompted many Republicans to accuse the Democrats of partisanship. Now wait a minute. Why are the Republicans not guilty of partisanship, since all nine of them voted as their president wishes? It seems to me that if anyone is being partisan, then everyone is. Then again, it depends on what we mean by “partisan”. Here’s my analysis. S is partisan if and only if there are sufficient nonpolitical reasons for doing D, but S does not do D because not doing D is the position of S’s party. In other words, S hews the party line and does not consider the matter on its merits. Let me make two suppositions and show what follows. First, suppose that there are sufficient nonpolitical reasons for voting for Tower. (He’s the best candidate for the job, let’s say.) Then the Democrats are being partisan. Second, suppose that there are insufficient nonpolitical reasons for voting for Tower. Then the Republicans are being partisan. The point is that we cannot determine who, if anyone, is being partisan until we determine whether there are good nonpolitical reasons for voting for Tower! That should be our focus—not whether someone is being partisan.

Cycling, Part 2

Here is a scene from a race in Belgium. Note the cobblestones.

A Year Ago

Here.

K. G. Armstrong on Motives and Arguments

These, then, are some of the objections that have been urged against the Retributive theory of punishment. In my view they are all mistaken—either because they are based on confusions about what the theory is, or else because they spring from erroneous moral judgments. One charge, that the proponents of the theory are sadists or have a vested religious interest in it, I shall not deal with. For all I know it could even be true, but it seems irrelevant to the present discussion; philosophers, of all people, should surely be above using the ploy of analysing a man's motives instead of meeting his arguments. As for the objection that the theory is out of date, i.e. unfashionable, this seems so ludicrous philosophically that I would not have mentioned it at all if it were not for the unfortunate fact that it is the most common objection of all. I shall certainly not bother with it any further, giving the reader credit for being free from what Belloc called "The degrading slavery of being a child of one's times".

(K. G. Armstrong, "The Retributivist Hits Back," Mind, n.s., 70 [October 1961]: 471-90, at 472 [boldface added])

Note from KBJ: Think of all the conservative arguments that progressives "reply" to not by investigating the truth of the argument's premises or the validity of the inferences but by analyzing the arguer's motives. Conservatives who argue that affirmative-action programs are unjust are said to be racists. (If the conservatives in question are black, they are "self-loathing.") Conservatives who believe that Roe v. Wade (1973) was wrongly decided are said to be misogynists. Conservatives who argue that the federal government should enforce immigration laws are said to be nativists, xenophobes, or racists. Conservatives who argue that the war in Iraq was justified are said to be warmongers, militarists, or fascists. Conservatives who oppose homosexual "marriage" are said to be homophobes. Conservatives who are patriotic are said to be jingoists. Conservatives who support capital punishment are said to be bloodthirsty. Conservatives who believe that religion has a rightful place in the public square are said to be theocrats. It goes on and on, ad nauseam. The great untold story of the past few decades is how and why progressives lost the ability to engage in rational argumentation. My theory, informally confirmed by experience, is that it has to do with their dominance of academia. Many progressives have walled themselves off from criticism. They spend their days nodding in agreement with their colleagues, making fun of conservatives, and enforcing political correctness. Meanwhile, their minds rot.

Dilbert

Here. (You thought I forgot, didn't you?)

Science and Religion

Longtime reader Emily Puskar sent a link to this interesting blog post. Isn't it sad that philosophers who happen to be religious are forced to hide behind a cloak of anonymity, lest their careers suffer as a result? What does that say about the moral character of contemporary philosophers? It tells me that they are ideologues first and philosophers second. You can be sure that Brian Leiter (the academic thug) will try to identify the author of this letter and do whatever he can to destroy the author's career. That is his modus operandi. Leiter's hatred of religion and religious people is pathological. It makes you wonder what sort of relationship he has/had with his father. Sigmund Freud said (in The Future of an Illusion) that theists so crave a supernatural father that they invent one. By parity of reasoning, atheists so hate their natural fathers that they try to kill (symbolically) the supernatural father that theists invent. Freud would have a field day with Leiter, who operates a successful smear machine out of the University of Chicago. Much of Leiter's smearing is done by his sycophants. It's quite an operation Leiter has going. His sycophants get the attention they crave; he gets to smear people without seeming to do so.

Addendum: Here is audio of Alvin Plantinga discussing science and religion. Here is his entry on that topic in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Curro Ergo Sum

This morning, in beautiful Fort Worth, Texas (my hometown for the past 16 years), I did my 21st footrace since Labor Day and my 147th overall. The sky was clear and the temperature was good for distance running, but the wind was vicious. The wind-chill factor had to be in the 20s (degrees Fahrenheit). I know that won't sound cold for many of you, but it's downright frigid for those of us who've lived in Texas for many years. I dreaded leaving the warmth of my car, which was parked in a multi-story garage about four blocks from the starting line.

It was so cold as we stood waiting that the woman next to me yelled, "Body heat!" To my surprise, she pulled me and another runner (a woman) to her side, so that our bodies were touching. I laughed, but the body heat felt good. I joked about the band Three Dog Night, which took its name from the practice (in the Australian outback) of sleeping with one's dogs on cold nights. The scene in downtown Fort Worth was spectacular. There we were, 17,000 runners strong, dwarfed by tall shimmering buildings, with spectators lining both sides of the street, the sky a gorgeous blue (reminding me of my former home, Tucson). You can't capture a scene like that with a camera, so I made a mental snapshot for later viewing.

I resume cycling next week, so this would be my final footrace until Labor Day. (I will continue running, obviously, just not racing.) My goal was to have fun, if that's possible in a 13.1-mile race. Finally, after shivering for 20 minutes, jumping up and down, rubbing my legs, and cuddling the woman next to me (she started it!), the gun sounded (at 7:30) and we were off. It was a chip-timed event, which meant I would get an accurate time. I turned my stopwatch on anyway, so I would have splits along the way. I forgot to mention that there were pacers in the crowd. My best half marathon time this season (of three previous races) was 1:39:08.48, so I lined up with the man who carried a "1:40" sign. I knew that I'd have a good finishing time if I could stay with him. Someone asked him whether he would run a steady pace. He said yes. That may seem like a silly question, but it's not. There are different ways to run a 1:40 half marathon. One way is to go out fast and let one's speed taper near the end. Most people (including me) fade. But the pacer said his plan was to stay at a 7:37 mile pace. I liked that idea, since sometimes I go out too fast and pay for it later.

I mentioned 17,000 runners. That was the announced total for all events: an ultra marathon (31.068 miles), a marathon (26.21875 miles), a half marathon (13.109375 miles), a 10K (6.214 miles), an adult 5K (3.107 miles), and a kids' 5K. The announcer said that there were 4,100 half marathoners registered. I estimated that I'd finish in the top 5%, despite not having trained properly. My longest run in three weeks was 4.3 miles. That's less than a third the distance I was about to run. Other runners, I assumed, had trained properly.

The first couple of miles were into the teeth of the north wind. Part of the course was downhill, out of the city center, which compensated for it. Eventually, we turned left and escaped the force of the wind, but the course had many turns, so we had either a headwind, a tailwind, or a crosswind at any given point. I haven't done an event at the Cowtown Marathon in 10 years (I ran marathons there in 1997, 1998, and 1999), so I had forgotten how hilly it is in comparison with the courses in Dallas. There were many small hills, and even a couple of big ones. The pacer, John, kept it steady, just as he promised. I ran alongside him (mostly to his left) the entire way, talking every now and then. He said he's 22 years old. He looked older. I told him I'm 51. He was supposed to get rid of the sign he was carrying after a couple of miles, but he carried it the entire way. It didn't weigh much, but the wind played havoc with it. His right arm must have been tired by the finish.

I thought there would be a crowd around John, but he and I were pretty much alone in the second half. Other runners would run with us for a while and either surge ahead or fall back. Two young women finished with us. At mile 11, my left hip started to ache. I decided to run through it. By the time I finished, it had all but gone away. It's fine. I noticed that with 100 yards or so to go, John eased up. He had a time sheet wrapped around his right wrist, which he checked at each mile marker. We must have been ahead of schedule. I wanted to finish with him rather than sprint, so I ran in place for a few seconds until he caught up. During this time, several runners went past me. Had I not tried to finish with John, I would have run faster during the final half mile and finished a minute or more faster than I did. Also, I would have been six or eight places higher in the overall standings. As I crossed the finish line in downtown Fort Worth, with thousands of people cheering, I turned, pointed to John, and applauded. He did a great job. My chip time was 1:39:36. John brought us in with 24 seconds to spare. I shook his hand, thanked him, and hustled to my car for warm clothing. I was freezing. During the race, I was fine, but as soon as I stopped, the wind began to bite. By 10:00, I was home, walking Shelbie on the nearby school grounds. After showering and eating soup and crackers, I spent an hour reading in my back yard with my back up against the house. What a beautiful day it was!

My mile paces during the four half marathons I did this season were 7:49.32 (2 November), 7:47.16 (14 December), 7:33.75 (7 February), and 7:35.85 (28 February). The first three were done in the heat, but the fourth had cold wind and hills, which made it just as hard (if not harder). I'm happy with today's performance. John and I ran 13 consecutive 7:36 miles (give or take 10 seconds). We were metronomes. Overall, I finished 233d of 3,678, which is the top 6.3%. I was 196th of 1,892 males (top 10.3%) and 12th of 153 (top 7.8%) in my age group (men 50-54). I take it that roughly 400 people who registered for the half marathon didn't finish (or didn't show up to race), because the announcer said that 4,100 people had registered.

I should add that the Cowtown Marathon was superbly organized. I was worried about traffic jams, with so many people trying to get into the heart of the city. I had a terrible experience with a traffic jam at the Dallas White Rock Marathon on 14 December. There were no jams today. I drove directly into the city, pulled into a parking garage, parked my car (10.4 miles from my house), walked to the registration area, stood in line for less than five minutes to get my bib number, and headed back to my car to prepare. It was well worth the $75 fee. (It would have been cheaper had I registered in advance.) Parking, by the way, was free. I think it was $10 in Dallas. If I had to rate my overall experience on a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being highest, it was 3 in Dallas and 10 in Fort Worth. I'm proud to live in Cowtown.

Addendum: Did I mention that, having burned off 1,442 calories during the race (110 calories per mile, whatever the speed), I get to eat a little more today? And you wonder why I run.

Addendum 2: The average wind speed for the day (28 February) was 24.2 miles per hour. I count a day as windy if the average wind speed is 10 miles per hour! The maximum wind speed was 35 miles per hour.

Cycling

Every sport has cheaters. It's human nature to try to get an edge on one's competitors, even if the edge is prohibited by the rules. Because of this, there will always be a battle—an arms race—between authorities and competitors. Here is a story about the latest move by cycling authorities.

Socialism

This New York Times reporter calls "socialist" a slur, but later in the column he admits that at least one United States senator, Vermont's Bernie Sanders, is a "self-identified socialist." Why doesn't the reporter compare Sanders's views with those of President Obama? If they share views (as I suspect they do), then isn't it accurate to describe President Obama as a socialist?

Addendum: Could it be that the reporter thinks that President Obama may not be labeled unless he (Obama) approves the label? That would explain why he labels Sanders but not Obama a socialist. Did journalists apply this standard to Ronald Reagan or George W. Bush?

From Today's New York Times

To the Editor:

Re “A Bold Plan Sweeps Away Reagan Ideas,” by David Leonhardt (Economic Scene, front page, Feb. 27):

Statistics on rising economic inequality in the United States often make people’s eyes glaze over. They shouldn’t.

President Obama’s attempt to restore some semblance of economic equality and fairness is of paramount importance. It’s the right thing to do morally.

It is also essential to re-establishing an economy and culture that can, in turn, stand behind all other necessary and vital policy changes, in every sphere of social life.

Consider the contrast: the soaring economic inequality of the Reagan-Bush era concentrated wealth and power. That has egregiously distorted our political system, tilting policy in favor of perpetuating inequality and frustrating crucial reforms. The bitter fruits of that distortion are evident all around, most obviously in the regulatory lapses that contributed to economic calamity.

It is going to require enormous effort to ensure that President Obama’s bold, good and essential budget proposal survives the torturous journey through Congress.

Richard E. Sclove
Amherst, Mass., Feb. 27, 2009

Note from KBJ: Does the "Reagan-Bush era" include Clinton?

Jefferson Starship, "Stranger" (1981)

Modern Times (1981).

"Remaking the American Social Contract"

I leave you this fine evening with a column by Charles Krauthammer.

Richard B. Brandt (1910-1997) on Ethical Consistency

I am inclined to think that we know with assurance part of the analysis of ethical terms; and I wish to describe briefly two elements which I think we know belong to an analysis of "right" in its normative sense. What I wish to propose is that there are two truth criteria for ethical statements, two material conditions under which we reject ethical statements as incorrect. The first of them has been discussed by many philosophers. It is expressed in Kant's categorical imperative, in the views of Hume and Adam Smith that revolve about their idea of the impartial spectator, in Sidgwick's axiom of justice, and in the writings, I think, of Mr. Ayer and Mr. Stevenson. Roughly, the point is that, if a person says, "This action A is wrong, but those other actions, B, C, D, which are essentially similar to it, are not wrong," we refuse to accept his statement. If A is to be wrong and B is to be right, there must be some difference between the natures of A and B. One way of putting it is that we demand ethical consistency. It is not easy to state just what ethical consistency is. We might put it tentatively thus: it is always mistaken for a person to say that A is wrong and B is right unless there is some property P which A has, and which B has not, such that he is willing to say, for all cases of the occurrence of P, that the presence of P makes the situation morally worse than it would otherwise be. Failure to follow this rule in one's moral utterances is not playing the game to which one commits himself in the use of moral language. Differences of opinion on matters of ethics we tolerate; but it is hard to tolerate moral inconsistency when a person is aware of it, for such inconsistency shows he is deliberately misusing moral language for the sake of personal gain or prejudice. What anyone is definitely committing himself not to do, when he uses moral language, is to give expression to what he personally wants; there is, as Hume said, a generality about moral language.

Let us consider now the second truth criterion. Suppose a person P says, "A is wrong," and shortly after says, "A is right." We might be puzzled by this, but perhaps we should say: "P has seen a light; now we know where he stands." There is no rule in English against saying A is right if one once said it was wrong, although there is a rule which prescribes that now one must say that formerly he was mistaken, since it would not make sense to say that the same action could have been wrong at an earlier time and right at a later time. This rule, however, is not my point. What I do wish to emphasize is that, while English usage does not prohibit changing one's mind in ethics, it does prohibit uttering an ethical sentence on the basis of a momentary impulse. When we say something is wrong, we definitely give the impression of a more than temporary attitude and commitment.

(Richard B. Brandt, "The Emotive Theory of Ethics," The Philosophical Review 59 [July 1950]: 305-18, at 315-6 [italics in original])

Note from KBJ: Philosophers are experts, but their expertise is neither evaluative nor factual. It is conceptual. Philosophers are trained to analyze concepts. The tool with which they do this is logic. The only argumentative leverage a philosopher has is the law of noncontradiction, which says that no proposition can be both true and not true. Thus, if you believe proposition p, then you cannot consistently believe not-p or anything that entails not-p. Suppose I wish to induce you to believe proposition p. I will have to show you that p follows logically from some other proposition (or conjunction of propositions) that you (1) already believe but (2) are not willing to give up. If you are willing to give it up, then you may refrain from believing p (or even believe not-p). There is always more than one way to eliminate an inconsistency. If I show you that three of your beliefs are inconsistent, then you must get rid of one of them. Which one you get rid of is up to you, not me. In a sense, philosophers are bearers of bad tidings, which may explain why they annoy people. They are constantly telling people that they (the people) have inconsistent beliefs. If they go beyond this and tell the people which belief(s) to give up, they have stopped being philosophers and started being preachers.

Global Warmism

George Will doesn't appreciate being lied about. Meretricious journalism indeed! The New York Times can't be trusted to report the news; it is hell-bent on shaping events, even in its so-called news stories. Andrew Revkin of the Times, who writes the Dot Earth blog, has to carry water for the global warmists; otherwise, he loses his sources and undermines his credibility among scientists, many of whom are politicized. (Note: A politicized scientist is not a scientist.)

Cycling

Here is the latest cycling technology.

Black Robe (1991)

I highly recommend this movie.

Baseball

Here is a New York Times column about "the Pedroia effect." I love small ball. I'll take a sacrifice bunt or a hit-and-run play over a home run any day of the week and twice on Sunday. The best baseball games end with scores of 1-0, 2-1, or 3-2. My adoptive team, the Texas Rangers, plays large ball. I accept it, but I don't like it.

Addendum: Somebody explain Brady Anderson's 1996 season.

Pegs

Here is Peggy Noonan's latest column. Here is Peg Kaplan's latest post.

"Hell on Wildlife"

What is going on up there, Steve?

A Year Ago

Here.