My approach to Utilitarianism as an ecumenical tract, defending a common creed rather than any particular form of the theory, is open to the following objection. If I am right then the work is significantly less important, and in some respects less interesting, than is commonly believed. My response to this objection is to embrace it. In fact, I suggest that the best explanation of the canonical status of Utilitarianism derives primarily from the work's pedagogical virtues. This little work fits nicely into an Introduction to Moral Philosophy course, being much more palatable to undergraduates than Sidgwick's dense Methods of Ethics or Bentham's tortuous Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. While it remains a marvelously fruitful collection of theoretical possibilities and a useful introduction to a vital approach to ethics, Utilitarianism does not develop Mill's own moral theory. We have reason to adopt something less than the most powerful or interesting interpretation of a work, however, when there is evidence that the author did not consider it particularly original or significant—as there is here.
(Daniel Jacobson, "J. S. Mill and the Diversity of Utilitarianism," Philosophers' Imprint 3 [June 2003], 17)
Note from KBJ: I spent part of the morning reading this interesting and well-written essay. Note how Jacobson bites the bullet when he says that he embraces the objection rather than allowing it to undermine his interpretation of Utilitarianism. To bite the bullet, philosophically speaking, is to accept what to many or most people would be an unacceptable implication of a theory.
