Keith Burgess-Jackson

Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) on Wisdom and Age

Thus in the ever-renewed controversy between Age and Youth, wisdom is not after all so clearly on the side of maturer counsels as it seems to be at first sight. When a youth is warned by his senior to abstain from some pleasure, on the ground of prudence, because it is not worth the possible pleasures that must be sacrificed for it and the future pains that it will entail; it is difficult for him to know how far the elder man can recall—even if he could once feel—the full rapture of the delight that he is asking the younger to renounce.

(Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981], bk. II, chap. III, sec. 7, pp. 148-9 [first published in 1907; 1st ed. published in 1874])

Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) on Pleasure and Pain

[W]e find that different kinds of past pleasures and pains do not equally admit of being revived in imagination. Thus, generally speaking, our more emotional and more representative pains are more easily revived than the more sensational and presentative: for example, it is at this moment much more easy for me to imagine the discomfort of expectancy which preceded a past sea-sickness than the pain of the actual nausea: although I infer—from the recollection of judgments passed at the time—that the former pain was trifling compared with the latter. To this cause it seems due that past hardships, toils, and anxieties often appear pleasurable when we look back upon them, after some interval; for the excitement, the heightened sense of life that accompanied the painful struggle, would have been pleasurable if taken by itself; and it is this that we recall rather than the pain.

(Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981], bk. II, chap. III, sec. 5, p. 144 [first published in 1907; 1st ed. published in 1874])

Note from KBJ: This passage explains why people run more than one marathon. I've run 11. I've done many difficult (and painful) things in my life, but nothing as difficult or painful as these marathons. As I like to put it, I hate running, but I love having run.

Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) on Ethical Egoism

To sum up: Egoism, if we merely understand by it a method that aims at Self-realisation, seems to be a form into which almost any ethical system may be thrown, without modifying its essential characteristics. And even when further defined as Egoistic Hedonism, it is still imperfectly distinguishable from Intuitionism if quality of pleasures is admitted as a consideration distinct from and overruling quantity. There remains then Pure or Quantitative Egoistic Hedonism, which, as a method essentially distinct from all others and widely maintained to be rational, seems to deserve a detailed examination. According to this the rational agent regards quantity of consequent pleasure and pain to himself as alone important in choosing between alternatives of action; and seeks always the greatest attainable surplus of pleasure over pain—which, without violation of usage, we may designate as his 'greatest happiness.' It seems to be this view and attitude of mind which is most commonly intended by the vaguer terms 'egoism,' 'egoistic': and therefore I shall allow myself to use these terms in this more precise signification.

(Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981], bk. I, chap. VII, sec. 2, p. 95 [first published in 1907; 1st ed. published in 1874])

Note from KBJ: Sidgwick, a utilitarian, is one of the few philosophers to have taken ethical egoism seriously. It is part of what makes him a great philosopher. Many philosophers today are prejudiced against ethical egoism. James Rachels, for example, calls it "wicked."

Note 2 from KBJ: Egoism, as understood by Sidgwick, is similar to utilitarianism in all respects but one. Both are consequentialist (in determining rightness, only consequences matter); both are monistic (there is only one intrinsic good); both are hedonistic (pleasure is that good); and both are maximizing (the right act is the act that maximizes the good). The only difference is whose pleasure counts. To a utilitarian, everyone's pleasure counts, and equally so; to an egoist, only the agent's pleasure counts. Utilitarianism is impartialistic; egoism is partialistic. Indeed, egoism is maximally partialistic.

Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) on Egoism and Utilitarianism

The discussion in the preceding section will have shown that not all the different views that are taken of the ultimate reason for doing what is concluded to be right lead to practically different methods of arriving at this conclusion. Indeed we find that almost any method may be connected with almost any ultimate reason by means of some—often plausible—assumption. Hence arises difficulty in the classification and comparison of ethical systems; since they often appear to have different affinities according as we consider Method or Ultimate Reason. In my treatment of the subject, difference of Method is taken as the paramount consideration: and it is on this account that I have treated the view in which Perfection is taken to be the Ultimate End as a variety of the Intuitionism which determines right conduct by reference to axioms of duty intuitively known; while I have made as marked a separation as possible between Epicureanism or Egoistic Hedonism, and the Universalistic or Benthamite Hedonism to which I propose to restrict the term Utilitarianism.

I am aware that these two latter methods are commonly treated as closely connected: and it is not difficult to find reasons for this. In the first place, they agree in prescribing actions as means to an end distinct from, and lying outside the actions; so that they both lay down rules which are not absolute but relative, and only valid if they conduce to the end. Again, the ultimate end is according to both methods the same in quality, i.e. pleasure; or, more strictly, the maximum of pleasure attainable, pains being subtracted. Besides, it is of course to a great extent true that the conduct recommended by the one principle coincides with that inculcated by the other. Though it would seem to be only in an ideal polity that 'self-interest well understood' leads to the perfect discharge of all social duties, still, in a tolerably well-ordered community it prompts to the fulfilment of most of them, unless under very exceptional circumstances. And, on the other hand, a Universalistic Hedonist may reasonably hold that his own happiness is that portion of the universal happiness which it is most in his power to promote, and which therefore is most especially entrusted to his charge. And the practical blending of the two systems is sure to go beyond their theoretical coincidence. It is much easier for a man to move in a sort of diagonal between Egoistic and Universalistic Hedonism, than to be practically a consistent adherent of either. Few men are so completely selfish, whatever their theory of morals may be, as not occasionally to promote the happiness of others from natural sympathetic impulse unsupported by Epicurean calculation. And probably still fewer are so resolutely unselfish as never to find "all men's good'' in their own with rather too ready conviction.

(Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981], bk. I, chap. VI, sec. 3, pp. 83-4 [footnote omitted] [first published in 1907; 1st ed. published in 1874])

Note from KBJ: Two things are worthy of comment in this passage by Sidgwick. First, he is pointing out the theoretical similarities between egoism and utilitarianism, which are often thought to be radically dissimilar. Both theories are teleological or consequentialist in nature. That is, both theories claim that the rightness or wrongness of an act depends solely on its consequences. In this respect, they differ from deontological theories, which claim that the rightness or wrongness of an act depends on something other than, or in addition to, its consequences. Another similarity is that both theories are hedonistic. That is, both theories claim that there is only one thing that is intrinsically good, namely, pleasure, and only one thing that is intrinsically bad, namely, pain. (We could say that both theories are monistic as well, which means that both theories claim that there is only one intrinsically good thing.) The difference between the theories is whose pleasures and pains count. To an egoist, only the agent's pleasures and pains count. To a utilitarian, the pleasures and pains of everyone affected by the act (including the agent) count. Egoism is a species (but not the only species) of partialism; utilitarianism is impartialism. The second thing worthy of comment in Sidgwick's passage is that, as he says, there may be a significant overlap between egoism and utilitarianism, as far as which acts the theories classify as right or wrong. The overlap is not perfect, however. All it takes to show that two theories are different is one case in which the theories generate different evaluations, and there certainly are such cases. Some critics of egoism make it seem as though there is little overlap between the theories, i.e., that they generate different evaluations in many or most cases. I'm with Sidgwick in thinking that there is significant overlap.

Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) on the Paradox of Hedonism

Many middle-aged Englishmen would maintain the view that business is more agreeable than amusement; but they would hardly find it so if they transacted the business with a perpetual conscious aim at the attendant pleasure. Similarly, the pleasures of thought and study can only be enjoyed in the highest degree by those who have an ardour of curiosity which carries the mind temporarily away from self and its sensations. In all kinds of Art, again, the exercise of the creative faculty is attended by intense and exquisite pleasures: but it would seem that in order to get them, one must forget them: the genuine artist at work seems to have a predominant and temporarily absorbing desire for the realisation of his ideal of beauty.

(Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981], bk. I, chap. IV, sec. 2, p. 49 [first published in 1907; 1st ed. published in 1874])

Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) on the Pleasures of Pursuit

Indeed, the pleasures afforded by the consciousness of eager activity, in which desire is an essential element, constitute a considerable item in the total enjoyment of life. It is almost a commonplace to say that such pleasures, which we may call generally the pleasures of Pursuit, are more important than the pleasures of Attainment: and in many cases it is the prospect of the former rather than of the latter that induces us to engage in a pursuit. In such cases it is peculiarly easy to distinguish the desire to attain the object pursued, from a desire of the pleasure of attainment: since the attainment only becomes pleasant in prospect because the pursuit itself stimulates a desire for what is pursued. Take, for example, the case of any game which involves—as most games do—a contest for victory. No ordinary player before entering on such a contest, has any desire for victory in it: indeed he often finds it difficult to imagine himself deriving gratification from such victory, before he has actually engaged in the competition. What he deliberately, before the game begins, desires is not victory, but the pleasant excitement of the struggle for it; only for the full development of this pleasure a transient desire to win the game is generally indispensable. This desire, which does not exist at first, is stimulated to considerable intensity by the competition itself: and in proportion as it is thus stimulated both the mere contest becomes more pleasurable, and the victory, which was originally indifferent, comes to afford a keen enjoyment.

(Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981], bk. I, chap. IV, sec. 2, pp. 46-7 [first published in 1907; 1st ed. published in 1874])

Note from KBJ: Compare Sidgwick with Vince Lombardi.

Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) on Received Morality

Again, all or most men in whom the moral consciousness is strongly developed find themselves from time to time in conflict with the commonly received morality of the society to which they belong: and thus—as was before said—have a crucial experience proving that duty does not mean to them what other men will disapprove of them for not doing.

(Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981], bk. I, chap. III, sec. 2, p. 30 [italics in original] [first published in 1907; 1st ed. published in 1874])

Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) on Ethics and Politics

But when we look closer at the relation thus constituted between Ethics and Politics, we see that a distinction has to be taken between actual or Positive Law and Ideal Law or Law as it ought to be. It is for the latter that Political Theory lays down principles; but it is Positive, not Ideal, Law that primarily determines right conduct for an individual here and now, in the manner just exemplified. No doubt if Positive and Ideal Law appear to me to diverge very widely—if (e.g.) I am convinced by political theory that a fundamental change in the law of property is desirable—this conviction is likely to influence my view of my moral duty under the existing law; but the extent of this influence is vague and uncertain. Suppose I am a slave-owner in a society in which slavery is established, and become convinced that private property in human beings should be abolished by law: it does not therefore follow that I shall regard it as my moral duty to set free my slaves at once. I may think immediate general abolition of slavery not only hopeless, but even inexpedient for the slaves themselves, who require a gradual education for freedom: so that it is better for the present to aim at legal changes that would cut off the worst evils of slavery, and meanwhile to set an example of humane and considerate treatment of bondsmen. Similar reasonings might be applied to the abolition of private property in the instruments of production, or in appointments to offices, civil or ecclesiastical. Speaking generally, the extent to which political ideals ought to influence moral duty would seem to depend partly on the apparent remoteness or nearness of the prospect of realising the ideal, partly on its imperativeness, or the expediency of immediate realisation: and the force attached to both these considerations is likely to vary with the political method adopted; so that it belongs to Politics rather than Ethics to determine them more precisely.

(Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981], bk. I, chap. II, sec. 1, pp. 16-7 [first published in 1907; 1st ed. published in 1874])

Note from KBJ: This passage by Sidgwick sheds light on Thomas Jefferson's decision to keep his slaves. Indeed, Sidgwick may have had Jefferson in mind when he wrote it.

Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) on Ultimate Ends

[W]e may perhaps say that prima facie the only two ends which have a strongly and widely supported claim to be regarded as rational ultimate ends are the two just mentioned, Happiness and Perfection or Excellence of human nature—meaning here by 'Excellence' not primarily superiority to others, but a partial realisation of, or approximation to, an ideal type of human Perfection. And we must observe that the adoption of the former of these ends leads us to two prima facie distinct methods, according as it is sought to be realised universally, or by each individual for himself alone. For though doubtless a man may often best promote his own happiness by labouring and abstaining for the sake of others, it seems to be implied in our common notion of self-sacrifice that actions most conducive to the general happiness do not—in this world at least—always tend also to the greatest happiness of the agent. And among those who hold that "happiness is our being's end and aim'' we seem to find a fundamental difference of opinion as to whose happiness it is that it is ultimately reasonable to aim at. For to some it seems that "the constantly proper end of action on the part of any individual at the moment of action is his real greatest happiness from that moment to the end of his life''; whereas others hold that the view of reason is essentially universal, and that it cannot be reasonable to take as an ultimate and paramount end the happiness of any one individual rather than that of any other—at any rate if equally deserving and susceptible of it—so that general happiness must be the "true standard of right and wrong, in the field of morals'' no less than of politics. It is, of course, possible to adopt an end intermediate between the two, and to aim at the happiness of some limited portion of mankind, such as one's family or nation or race: but any such limitation seems arbitrary, and probably few would maintain it to be reasonable per se, except as the most practicable way of aiming at the general happiness, or of indirectly securing one's own.

(Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981], bk. I, chap. I, sec. 4, pp. 9-10 [footnotes omitted] [first published in 1907; 1st ed. published in 1874])

Note from KBJ: Given that happiness is the ultimate end, one must determine whose happiness counts, and how much. At one extreme, everyone's happiness counts equally. This is utilitarianism. At the other extreme, only the agent's happiness counts. This is egoism. There are, as Sidgwick points out, many intermediate points. One might hold that only the happiness of one's family counts, or that only the happiness of one's compatriots counts, or that only the happiness of members of one's race counts. We can give names to these if we wish, such as familialism, nationalism, and racialism. If we call the view that everyone's happiness counts equally "impartialism," then we have many species of "partialism." Why Sidgwick views only some of these species as "arbitrary" is puzzling. It would seem that either all species of partialism (including egoism) are arbitrary or no species of partialism are arbitrary. My own view is the latter.

Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) on Ethics

The boundaries of the study called Ethics are variously and often vaguely conceived: but they will perhaps be sufficiently defined, at the outset, for the purposes of the present treatise, if a 'Method of Ethics' is explained to mean any rational procedure by which we determine what individual human beings 'ought'—or what it is 'right' for them—to do, or to seek to realise by voluntary action. By using the word "individual" I provisionally distinguish the study of Ethics from that of Politics, which seeks to determine the proper constitution and the right public conduct of governed societies: both Ethics and Politics being, in my view, distinguished from positive sciences by having as their special and primary object to determine what ought to be, and not to ascertain what merely is, has been, or will be.

(Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981], bk. I, chap. I, sec. 1, p. 1 [footnotes omitted] [first published in 1907; 1st ed. published in 1874])