Keith Burgess-Jackson

Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) on Utilitarianism and Common Sense

If, then, we are to regard the morality of Common Sense as a machinery of rules, habits, and sentiments, roughly and generally but not precisely or completely adapted to the production of the greatest possible happiness for sentient beings generally; and if, on the other hand, we have to accept it as the actually established machinery for attaining this end, which we cannot replace at once by any other, but can only gradually modify; it remains to consider the practical effects of the complex and balanced relation in which a scientific Utilitarian thus seems to stand to the Positive Morality of his age and country.

Generally speaking, he will clearly conform to it, and endeavour to promote its development in others. For, though the imperfection that we find in all the actual conditions of human existence—we may even say in the universe at large as judged from a human point of view—is ultimately found even in Morality itself, in so far as this is contemplated as Positive; still, practically, we are much less concerned with correcting and improving than we are with realising and enforcing it. The Utilitarian must repudiate altogether that temper of rebellion against the established morality, as something purely external and conventional, into which the reflective mind is always apt to fall when it is first convinced that the established rules are not intrinsically reasonable. He must, of course, also repudiate as superstitious that awe of it as an absolute or Divine Code which Intuitional moralists inculcate. Still, he will naturally contemplate it with reverence and wonder, as a marvellous product of nature, the result of long centuries of growth, showing in many parts the same fine adaptation of means to complex exigencies as the most elaborate structures of physical organisms exhibit: he will handle it with respectful delicacy as a mechanism, constructed of the fluid element of opinions and dispositions, by the indispensable aid of which the actual quantum of human happiness is continually being produced; a mechanism which no 'politicians or philosophers' could create, yet without which the harder and coarser machinery of Positive Law could not be permanently maintained, and the life of man would become—as Hobbes forcibly expresses it—"solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."

(Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981], bk. IV, chap. V, sec. 1, pp. 475-6 [italics in original; footnote omitted] [first published in 1907; 1st ed. published in 1874])

Note from KBJ: Unlike, say, Peter Singer, Sidgwick was respectful of commonsense morality. Singer, for example, has attacked the sanctity-of-life doctrine and the acts-and-omissions doctrine. He has argued that famine relief is a matter of justice and not, as most people think, charity. He is a progressive first and a utilitarian second. Sidgwick was a utilitarian first and a progressive second.

Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) on Law and Morality

[N]ormally in a well-organised society the most important and indispensable rules of social behaviour will be legally enforced and the less important left to be maintained by Positive Morality. Law will constitute, as it were, the skeleton of social order, clothed upon by the flesh and blood of Morality.

(Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981], bk. IV, chap. III, Appendix, pp. 458-9 [first published in 1907; 1st ed. published in 1874])

Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) on Christian Morality

Among definite changes in the current morality of the Græco-Roman civilised world, which are to be attributed mainly if not entirely to the extension and intensification of sympathy due to Christianity, the following may be especially noted: (1) the severe condemnation and final suppression of the practice of exposing infants; (2) effective abhorrence of the barbarism of gladiatorial combats; (3) immediate moral mitigation of slavery, and a strong encouragement of emancipation; (4) great extension of the eleemosynary provision made for the sick and poor.

(Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981], bk. IV, chap. III, sec. 7, p. 455, n. 1 [first published in 1907; 1st ed. published in 1874])

Note from KBJ: When militant atheists such as Daniel Dennett, Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens, and Sam Harris claim that religion (especially Christianity) has been a force for evil in the world, are they counting the things Sidgwick mentions? Of course not; unlike Sidgwick, they're intellectually dishonest. I'm an atheist, but I have no hesitation in saying that the world is a much better place with religion in it than it would be without religion. Christianity in particular has done a world of good. I, for one, am grateful.

Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) on Marriage and Children

[T]he peculiar intensity and delicacy of the moral sentiments that govern the relations of the sexes are thoroughly justified by the vast importance to society of the end to which they are obviously a means,—the maintenance, namely, of the permanent unions which are held to be necessary for the proper rearing and training of children. Hence the first and fundamental rule in this department is that which directly secures conjugal fidelity: and the utilitarian grounds for protecting marriage indirectly, by condemning all extra-nuptial intercourse of the sexes, are obvious: for to remove the moral censure that rests on such intercourse would seriously diminish men's motives for incurring the restraints and burdens which marriage entails; and the youth of both sexes would form habits of feeling and conduct tending to unfit them for marriage; and, if such intercourse were fertile, it would be attended with that imperfect care of the succeeding generation, which it seems the object of permanent unions to prevent; while if it were sterile, the future of the human race would, as far as we can see, be still more profoundly imperilled.

(Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981], bk. IV, chap. III, sec. 6, p. 450 [first published in 1907; 1st ed. published in 1874])

Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) on Beneficence

We noticed that the main utilitarian reason why it is not right for every rich man to distribute his superfluous wealth among the poor, is that the happiness of all is on the whole most promoted by maintaining in adults generally (except married women), the expectation that each will be thrown on his own resources for the supply of his own wants. But if I am made aware that, owing to a sudden calamity that could not have been foreseen, another's resources are manifestly inadequate to protect him from pain or serious discomfort, the case is altered; my theoretical obligation to consider his happiness as much as my own becomes at once practical; and I am bound to make as much effort to relieve him as will not entail a greater loss of happiness to myself or others. If, however, the calamity is one which might have been foreseen and averted by proper care, my duty becomes more doubtful: for then by relieving him I seem to be in danger of encouraging improvidence in others. In such a case a Utilitarian has to weigh this indirect evil against the direct good of removing pain and distress: and it is now more and more generally recognised that the question of providing for the destitute has to be treated as a utilitarian problem of which these are the elements,—whether we are considering the minimum that should be secured to them by law, or the proper supplementary action of private charity.

Poverty, however, is not the only case in which it is conducive to the general happiness that one man should render unbought services to another. In any condition or calling a man may find himself unable to ward off some evil, or to realise some legitimate or worthy end, without assistance of such kind as he cannot purchase on the ordinary commercial terms;—assistance which, on the one hand, will have no bad effect on the receiver, from the exceptional nature of the emergency, while at the same time it may not be burdensome to the giver. Here, again, some jurists have thought that where the service to be rendered is great, and the burden of rendering it very slight, it might properly be made matter of legal obligation: so that (e.g.) if I could save a man from drowning by merely holding out a hand, I should be legally punishable if I omitted the act. But, however this may be, the moral rule condemning the refusal of aid in such emergencies is obviously conducive to the general happiness.

(Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981], bk. IV, chap. III, sec. 3, pp. 436-7 [first published in 1907; 1st ed. published in 1874])

Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) on Marriage

It is necessary for the well-being of mankind that in each generation children should be produced in adequate numbers, neither too many nor too few; and that, as they cannot be left to provide for themselves, they should be adequately nourished and protected during the period of infancy; and further, that they should be carefully trained in good habits, intellectual, moral, and physical: and it is commonly believed that the best or even the only known means of attaining these ends in even a tolerable degree is afforded by the existing institution of the Family, resting as it does on a basis of legal and moral rules combined. For Law fixes a minimum of mutual services and draws the broad outlines of behaviour for the different members of the family, imposing on the parents lifelong union and complete mutual fidelity and the duty of providing for their children the necessaries of life up to a certain age; in return for which it gives them the control of their children for the same period, and sometimes lays on the latter the burden of supporting their parents when aged and destitute: so that Morality, in inculcating a completer harmony of interests and an ampler interchange of kindnesses, is merely filling in the outlines drawn by Law.

(Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981], bk. IV, chap. III, sec. 3, p. 435 [footnote omitted] [first published in 1907; 1st ed. published in 1874])

Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) on Partiality

Here, however, it seems that even fair-minded opponents have scarcely understood the Utilitarian position. They have attacked Bentham's well-known formula, "every man to count for one, nobody for more than one," on the ground that the general happiness will be best attained by inequality in the distribution of each one's services. But so far as it is clear that it will be best attained in this way, Utilitarianism will necessarily prescribe this way of aiming at it; and Bentham's dictum must be understood merely as making the conception of the ultimate end precise—laying down that one person's happiness is to be counted for as much as another's (supposed equal in degree) as an element of the general happiness—not as directly prescribing the rules of conduct by which this end will be best attained. And the reasons why it is, generally speaking, conducive to the general happiness that each individual should distribute his beneficence in the channels marked out by commonly recognised ties and claims, are tolerably obvious.

(Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981], bk. IV, chap. III, sec. 3, pp. 432-3 [first published in 1907; 1st ed. published in 1874])

Note from KBJ: It's logically possible that overall utility is maximized by each person's promoting his or her interests to the exclusion of others. Indeed, I believe this is true. Egoism is both an end in itself and a means to the utilitarian end.

Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) on Do-Goodism

Nor, further, does the comprehensive range which Utilitarians give to Benevolence, in stating as their ultimate end the greatest happiness of all sentient beings, seem to be really opposed to Common Sense; for in so far as certain Intuitional moralists restrict the scope of the direct duty of Benevolence to human beings, and regard our duties to brute animals as merely indirect and derived "from the duty of Self-culture," they rather than their Utilitarian opponents appear paradoxical. And if, in laying down that each agent is to consider all other happiness as equally important with his own, Utilitarianism seems to go beyond the standard of duty commonly prescribed under the head of Benevolence, it yet can scarcely be said to conflict with Common Sense on this point. For the practical application of this theoretical impartiality of Utilitarianism is limited by several important considerations. In the first place, generally speaking, each man is better able to provide for his own happiness than for that of other persons, from his more intimate knowledge of his own desires and needs, and his greater opportunities of gratifying them. And besides, it is under the stimulus of self-interest that the active energies of most men are most easily and thoroughly drawn out: and if this were removed, general happiness would be diminished by a serious loss of those means of happiness which are obtained by labour; and also, to some extent, by the diminution of the labour itself. For these reasons it would not under actual circumstances promote the universal happiness if each man were to concern himself with the happiness of others as much as with his own. While if I consider the duty abstractly and ideally, even Common Sense morality seems to bid me "love my neighbour as myself."

(Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981], bk. IV, chap. III, sec. 3, p. 431 [first published in 1907; 1st ed. published in 1874])

Note from KBJ: A do-gooder is "a well-meaning but unrealistic philanthropist or reformer." The Oxford American Dictionary and Language Guide (1999), 282.

Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) on the Morality of Common Sense

It may be shown, I think, that the Utilitarian estimate of consequences not only supports broadly the current moral rules, but also sustains their generally received limitations and qualifications: that, again, it explains anomalies in the Morality of Common Sense, which from any other point of view must seem unsatisfactory to the reflective intellect; and moreover, where the current formula is not sufficiently precise for the guidance of conduct, while at the same time difficulties and perplexities arise in the attempt to give it additional precision, the Utilitarian method solves these difficulties and perplexities in general accordance with the vague instincts of Common Sense, and is naturally appealed to for such solution in ordinary moral discussions. It may be shown further, that it not only supports the generally received view of the relative importance of different duties, but is also naturally called in as arbiter, where rules commonly regarded as co-ordinate come into conflict: that, again, when the same rule is interpreted somewhat differently by different persons, each naturally supports his view by urging its Utility, however strongly he may maintain the rule to be self-evident and known a priori: that where we meet with marked diversity of moral opinion on any point, in the same age and country, we commonly find manifest and impressive utilitarian reasons on both sides: and that finally the remarkable discrepancies found in comparing the moral codes of different ages and countries are for the most part strikingly correlated to differences in the effects of actions on happiness, or in men's foresight of, or concern for, such effects. Most of these points are noticed by Hume, though in a somewhat casual and fragmentary way: . . .

(Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981], bk. IV, chap. III, sec. 1, pp. 425-6 [first published in 1907; 1st ed. published in 1874])

Note from KBJ: Richard A. Posner has argued that wealth maximization is the best theory of the common law. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 7th ed. (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2007), 25. He calls this "positive [as opposed to normative] economic analysis of law." Here we find Sidgwick arguing that utilitarianism (i.e., the principle of utility) is the best theory of commonsense morality. We might call this "positive [as opposed to normative] utilitarianism." Suppose Sidgwick is correct. Nothing follows concerning the acceptability of utilitarianism. That utilitarianism is latent in commonsense morality does not entail that it ought to be, much less that it should be our guide as we decide what to do. By the same token, just because wealth maximization is latent in the common law does not entail that it ought to be, much less that it should guide judges, legislators, or other policymakers. Perhaps policymakers should pursue some other goal besides (or in addition to) efficiency (such as justice).

Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) on the Distribution of Happiness

There is one more point that remains to be noticed. It is evident that there may be many different ways of distributing the same quantum of happiness among the same number of persons; in order, therefore, that the Utilitarian criterion of right conduct may be as complete as possible, we ought to know which of these ways is to be preferred. This question is often ignored in expositions of Utilitarianism. It has perhaps seemed somewhat idle, as suggesting a purely abstract and theoretical perplexity, that could have no practical exemplification; and no doubt, if all the consequences of actions were capable of being estimated and summed up with mathematical precision, we should probably never find the excess of pleasure over pain exactly equal in the case of two competing alternatives of conduct. But the very indefiniteness of all hedonistic calculations, which was sufficiently shown in Book ii., renders it by no means unlikely that there may be no cognisable difference between the quantities of happiness involved in two sets of consequences respectively; the more rough our estimates necessarily are, the less likely we shall be to come to any clear decision between two apparently balanced alternatives. In all such cases, therefore, it becomes practically important to ask whether any mode of distributing a given quantum of happiness is better than any other. Now the Utilitarian formula seems to supply no answer to this question: at least we have to supplement the principle of seeking the greatest happiness on the whole by some principle of Just or Right distribution of this happiness. The principle which most Utilitarians have either tacitly or expressly adopted is that of pure equality—as given in Bentham's formula, "everybody to count for one, and nobody for more than one." And this principle seems the only one which does not need a special justification; for, as we saw, it must be reasonable to treat any one man in the same way as any other, if there be no reason apparent for treating him differently.¹

¹It should be observed that the question here is as to the distribution of Happiness, not the means of happiness. If more happiness on the whole is produced by giving the same means of happiness to B rather than to A, it is an obvious and incontrovertible deduction from the Utilitarian principle that it ought to be given to B, whatever inequality in the distribution of the means of happiness this may involve.

(Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981], bk. IV, chap. I, sec. 2, pp. 416-7 [italics in original] [first published in 1907; 1st ed. published in 1874])

Note from KBJ: Sidgwick has just adulterated his utilitarian theory. Utilitarianism is monistic; it postulates that there is only one intrinsic good: happiness. Sidgwick "supplements" it by postulating a second intrinsic good: equality. But if there are two intrinsic goods, what is to be done when they cannot both be produced? Suppose there are two actions available to me. In one, I can distribute 10 units of happiness equally to 10 people. In the other, I can distribute 11 units of happiness unequally to 10 people. Utility dictates that I perform the second action; equality dictates that I perform the first action. A consistent utilitarian must deny equality any intrinsic value. If two actions produce the same quantity of happiness, but distribute it differently, then a utilitarian must be indifferent between them. The best way to reflect this indifference is to flip a coin.

Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) on Animals

We have next to consider who the "all'' are, whose happiness is to be taken into account. Are we to extend our concern to all the beings capable of pleasure and pain whose feelings are affected by our conduct? or are we to confine our view to human happiness? The former view is the one adopted by Bentham and Mill, and (I believe) by the Utilitarian school generally: and is obviously most in accordance with the universality that is characteristic of their principle. It is the Good Universal, interpreted and defined as 'happiness' or 'pleasure,' at which a Utilitarian considers it his duty to aim: and it seems arbitrary and unreasonable to exclude from the end, as so conceived, any pleasure of any sentient being.

(Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981], bk. IV, chap. I, sec. 2, p. 414 [italics in original] [first published in 1907; 1st ed. published in 1874])

Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) on Motivation

[T]he doctrine that Universal Happiness is the ultimate standard must not be understood to imply that Universal Benevolence is the only right or always best motive of action. For, as we have before observed, it is not necessary that the end which gives the criterion of rightness should always be the end at which we consciously aim: and if experience shows that the general happiness will be more satisfactorily attained if men frequently act from other motives than pure universal philanthropy, it is obvious that these other motives are reasonably to be preferred on Utilitarian principles.

(Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981], bk. IV, chap. I, sec. 1, p. 413 [italics in original] [first published in 1907; 1st ed. published in 1874])

Note from KBJ: Experience does show that "the general happiness will be more satisfactorily attained if men frequently act from other motives than pure universal philanthropy." Indeed, I would argue, with Adam Smith, that the motive of self-interest conduces to "the general happiness." A utilitarian, therefore, should prefer self-interest (i.e., particularized benevolence) to universal benevolence.

Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) on Utilitarianism

By Utilitarianism is here meant the ethical theory, that the conduct which, under any given circumstances, is objectively right, is that which will produce the greatest amount of happiness on the whole; that is, taking into account all whose happiness is affected by the conduct.

(Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981], bk. IV, chap. I, sec. 1, p. 411 [first published in 1907; 1st ed. published in 1874])

Note from KBJ: Classical utilitarianism of the sort espoused by Bentham, Mill, and Sidgwick has five features, all of which are mentioned (or suggested) by Sidgwick in this short quotation. First, it is consequentialistic. This means that the rightness of an act is a function solely of its consequences. Those who deny this are called deontologists. Second, it is monistic. This means that there is only one intrinsically good thing. Those who deny this are called pluralists. Third, it is hedonistic. This means that the one intrinsically good thing is happiness (which the classical utilitarians defined, oddly, as pleasure and the absence of pain). Some utilitarians reject hedonism in favor of welfarism, preference satisfaction, or desire satisfaction. Fourth, it is optimific. The right act maximizes the good; it does not merely produce a satisfactory amount of it. Those who deny this are called satisficing utilitarians. Fifth, it is impartialistic. As Sidgwick says, it takes into account "all whose happiness is affected by the conduct" (including nonhuman animals). Those who deny this are called partialists. Egoists are partialists, but so are familialists, clanists, tribalists, racialists, credalists, and nationalists. Think of utilitarianism and egoism as lying at opposite ends of a spectrum, with many intermediate possibilities.

Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) on Crime and Punishment

Let us then examine more closely wherein Desert consists; and we will begin with Good Desert or Merit, as being of the most fundamental and permanent importance; for we may hope that crime and its punishment will decrease and gradually disappear as the world improves, but the right or best distribution of the means of wellbeing is an object that we must always be striving to realise.

(Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981], bk. III, chap. V, sec. 5, p. 283 [first published in 1907; 1st ed. published in 1874])

Note from KBJ: Sidgwick might well have added: "We may hope that humans evolve wings, so that they may fly." How could a man as intelligent as Sidgwick have thought that crime and punishment might one day disappear? Did he not study history? Did he think that, all of a sudden, humans would change their nature? It's mind-boggling to see such detachment from reality in a man who is otherwise sensible. I chalk it up to progressive ideology, which views humans as perfectible rather than, as conservatives see it, incorrigible.

Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) on Retributive Justice

[I]t seems still to be widely held that Justice requires pain to be inflicted on a man who has done wrong, even if no benefit result either to him or to others from the pain. Personally, I am so far from holding this view that I have an instinctive and strong moral aversion to it: and I hesitate to attribute it to Common Sense, since I think that it is gradually passing away from the moral consciousness of educated persons in the most advanced communities: but I think it is still perhaps the more ordinary view.

(Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981], bk. III, chap. V, sec. 5, p. 281 [first published in 1907; 1st ed. published in 1874])

Note from KBJ: There are three types of retributivism, each of which utilitarians such as Sidgwick reject. The first is known as minimal retributivism. It holds that only the guilty may be punished. The second, permissive retributivism, holds that anyone who is guilty may be punished (even if no good comes of it). The third, maximal retributivism, holds that everyone who is guilty must be punished (even if no good comes of it). Utilitarians believe that punishment is justified only if, and only to the extent that, good comes of it. There is nothing primitive or barbaric about retributivism, as Sidgwick implies. In fact, I would argue that punishing the innocent or not punishing the guilty is barbaric. Note that one can be a minimal retributivist without being a permissive retributivist and that one can be a permissive retributivist without being a maximal retributivist. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), who was hardly uneducated or primitive, was a maximal retributivist.

Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) on Divine Justice

[W]hen we speak of the world as justly governed by God, we seem to mean that, if we could know the whole of human existence, we should find that happiness is distributed among men according to their deserts. And Divine Justice is thought to be a pattern which Human Justice is to imitate as far as the conditions of human society allow.

(Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981], bk. III, chap. V, sec. 5, p. 280 [first published in 1907; 1st ed. published in 1874])

Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) on Distributive Justice

Ideal Justice, as we commonly conceive it, seems to demand that not only Freedom but all other benefits and burdens should be distributed, if not equally, at any rate justly,—Justice in distribution being regarded as not identical with Equality, but merely exclusive of arbitrary inequality.

(Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981], bk. III, chap. V, sec. 5, pp. 278-9 [first published in 1907; 1st ed. published in 1874])

Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) on Justice

[F]rom one point of view, we are disposed to think that the customary distribution of rights, goods, and privileges, as well as burdens and pains, is natural and just, and that this ought to be maintained by law, as it usually is: while, from another point of view, we seem to recognise an ideal system of rules of distribution which ought to exist, but perhaps have never yet existed, and we consider laws to be just in proportion as they conform to this ideal. It is the reconciliation between these two views which is the chief problem of political Justice.

(Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981], bk. III, chap. V, sec. 3, p. 273 [italics in original; footnote omitted] [first published in 1907; 1st ed. published in 1874])

Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) on Duties to Animals

[I]t is not quite clear whether we owe benevolence to men alone, or to other animals also. That is, there is a general agreement that we ought to treat all animals with kindness, so far as to avoid causing them unnecessary pain; but it is questioned whether this is directly due to sentient beings as such, or merely prescribed as a means of cultivating kindly dispositions towards men. Intuitional moralists of repute have maintained this latter view: I think, however, that Common Sense is disposed to regard this as a hard-hearted paradox, and to hold with Bentham that the pain of animals is per se to be avoided.

(Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981], bk. III, chap. IV, sec. 2, p. 241 [first published in 1907; 1st ed. published in 1874])

Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) on Universalizability

We cannot judge an action to be right for A and wrong for B, unless we can find in the natures or circumstances of the two some difference which we can regard as a reasonable ground for difference in their duties. If therefore I judge any action to be right for myself, I implicitly judge it to be right for any other person whose nature and circumstances do not differ from my own in some important respects. Now by making this latter judgment explicit, we may protect ourselves against the danger which besets the conscience, of being warped and perverted by strong desire, so that we too easily think that we ought to do what we very much wish to do. For if we ask ourselves whether we believe that any similar person in similar circumstances ought to perform the contemplated action, the question will often disperse the false appearance of rightness which our strong inclination has given to it. We see that we should not think it right for another, and therefore that it cannot be right for us. Indeed this test of the rightness of our volitions is so generally effective, that Kant seems to have held that all particular rules of duty can be deduced from the one fundamental rule "Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a universal law of nature." But this appears to me an error analogous to that of supposing that Formal Logic supplies a complete criterion of truth. I should agree that a volition which does not stand this test is to be condemned; but I hold that a volition which does stand it may after all be wrong. For I conceive that all (or almost all) persons who act conscientiously could sincerely will the maxims on which they act to be universally adopted: while at the same time we continually find such persons in thoroughly conscientious disagreement as to what each ought to do in a given set of circumstances. Under these circumstances, to say that all such persons act rightly—in the objective sense—because their maxims all conform to Kant's fundamental rule, would obliterate altogether the distinction between subjective and objective rightness; it would amount to affirming that whatever any one thinks right is so, unless he is in error as to the facts of the case to which his judgment applies. But such an affirmation is in flagrant conflict with common sense; and would render the construction of a scientific code of morality futile: as the very object of such a code is to supply a standard for rectifying men's divergent opinions.

(Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981], bk. III, chap. I, sec. 3, pp. 209-10 [first published in 1907; 1st ed. published in 1874])

Note from KBJ: Sidgwick is saying that universalizability is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for rightness. An act can be shown to be wrong by showing that it is not universalizable; but it cannot be shown to be right by showing that it is universalizable.